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extremities which thought had engendered. Dr. Hirsch thinks that the immanent self-criticism of every purely ethical *Weltanschauung* has been consummated in Fichte's philosophical development. The systematic value of this self-criticism is all the greater by virtue of its having taken place within the sphere of ethical idealism. The refutation of ethical idealism by appealing to the fact of universal sinfulness, was remote from Fichte, who never acknowledged that this fact was inevitable. But our author contends that he who cannot ignore the fact of universal sinfulness must evaluate the religious position which Fichte achieved, as untenable.

Dr. Hirsch has scrutinized Fichte's works in a painstaking manner. He has gathered the data exhaustively, and much that he says is illuminating. But—so it seems to this reviewer—his critical approach is faulty. All modern thought inherited an uncriticised *a priori* basis of experience; that is, an experience-less basis of experience. There has been a progressive reduction of this basis through our modern centuries. We have at length accepted frankly the task of demonstrating the complete experiential origin of the *a priori* element, by whatever name it be called. Now, what of the traditional *a priori* element did Fichte retain? What peculiar form did it take in his system? What contribution did he make to the historic transition to an exclusively experiential basis of experience, and what in this line did he bequeath as task to those who came after him? These questions indicate the method of treating the subject from the point of view of modern philosophical criticism. But Hirsch is a German; and it seems that, whether in philosophical system or in social structure, the German is definitively committed to an *a priori*, that is, an absolute of some kind.

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THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE. DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH, Ph.D.
The Macmillan Co. 1915. Pp. xviii, 503. \$2.50.

"The method of idealistic epistemology is like that of the quack physician; it first administers a drug which makes the patient's ailment chronic, thus making its own further services permanently indispensable." Even the idealists will have to admit some plausibility in this charge of Professor Macintosh in his very important book. For when the idealistic philosopher has introduced the neophyte into his wonderland, or put him through Alice's looking-

glass, many problems which were difficult enough before in the waking world become insoluble without his guidance. But the neo-realist is not found very much more satisfactory than the idealist in his interpretation of Being, and the dualist is lost in hopeless agnosticism. Critical monism is the term applied by Dr. Macintosh to his own theory of knowledge, and he makes out a very strong case for it.

The greatest question of epistemology for the last century has been, What kind of stuff is reality made of, and in what way or ways, if at all, do we human beings have experience of or acquaintance with it? Dr. Macintosh begins with the dualism which found its most famous expounder in Kant. There is the phenomenal world of things as they appear to our senses, or more strictly the world of our sensations and ideas, and the noumenal world of things-in-themselves, the true world of reality which lies back of the appearances. But there is no point of coincidence between these two worlds, and we are shut up to the knowledge of the world of our senses and can know nothing whatever about the ultimate reality. But if this is true, says our author, then we have no evidence of the existence of things-in-themselves, and it is dogmatism to assume that there are such things. One after another he considers the forms of dualism proposed by a long list of avowed agnostics, and by dualists who did not fully acknowledge agnosticism but are logically involved in it.

Professor Macintosh holds that the reasoning which leads to the Kantian agnosticism might be fairly illustrated in this syllogism: "What I suppose to be experience of independent reality is included within what I experience. But mere sense-impressions, which I do not know to be valid of independent reality, are also included in what I experience. Therefore what I suppose to be experience of independent reality is mere sense-impression, which I do not know to be valid of independent reality." A slight inspection will reveal the fallacy of "undistributed middle." This conclusion, however supported, that we never know "independent reality" in sense-experience, is, according to the author, the great error in Kant's system.

About a third of the book is then concerned with the fifty-seven or more varieties of idealism, or "*idea*-ism" as it might better be called to distinguish it from the view held by all moral persons that there are "ideals" which have valid authority over every personal life, a doctrine from which these systems of idealistic theories of knowledge or reality have gained much of their prestige and with which they have been often confused. "Idealistic absolute epistemo-

logical monism," the forms of which are now discussed, is defined as the view that "the real object and the perceived object are, at the moment of perception, numerically one, and the real object cannot exist at other moments, independently of any perception." Some types of idealism, however, identify the real as an abstraction from the immediately given, rather than the immediate datum of consciousness. We need not here dwell on the author's brief but satisfactory discussion of mystical idealism and logical idealism, the former especially familiar in the philosophy of India and the teachings of Christian mystics and the latter presented by Plato.

The third elemental type of idealism is the psychological — and from it many of our modern philosophical troubles flow. This is defined as "the interpretation of the physical object, under the influence of an erroneous suggestion arising in connection with the psychological point of view, as being essentially *idea*, in the psychological sense of that word, i.e. as being simply a part of consciousness, a content of conscious life which depends upon consciousness for its existence." Dr. Macintosh exposes the fallacy of this position by stating its defence in various forms, one of which, similar to the argument for dualism, involves the undistributed middle, as follows: "The unreal objectively is subjective (related to a subject); similarly all of which one is conscious is subjective (related to a subject); therefore all of which one is conscious is unreal objectively (mere idea)." Professor Perry's characterization of the argument as involving the fallacy of the ego-centric predicament, is approved. Limitations of space forbid even mention of the many interesting and popular forms of psychological idealism with which Professor Macintosh deals at length. As none of them is able to avoid this initial fallacy or to neutralize it by the addition of other ingenious fallacies, they must all be considered unsatisfactory. Chapter IX on "The Disintegration of Idealism" suggests the fate which the author sees already overtaking this doctrine.

Realism in present epistemology is the view "that the real object and the perceived object are at the moment of perception numerically one and that the real object may exist at other moments apart from perception." The author distinguishes two kinds, dogmatic and critical. The "new realists" of today defend the former kind, in which it is held "that 'secondary' or sense-qualities are *independent* of relation to a sensing subject," while his own, the "critical" view is that secondary qualities are *dependent* upon relation to the subject for their existence. A number of the neo-realists go from the rejection of the activity of consciousness in the creation of the secondary

qualities of objects, to a rejection of consciousness altogether as having any real existence, or to the position that it is a relation between physical objects.

In his own careful and convincing statement of his critical realism, Dr. Macintosh adds to the primary and secondary qualities distinguished by Locke, tertiary qualities. Primary qualities of physical objects he holds to be those discovered through sense-activity but not produced by it. Secondary qualities are discovered in the object only because produced and put there by the subject of sense-activity. Tertiary qualities (principally values) are placed in the object not by sense but by purposive though purely psychical activity of the subject.

In discussing the ways and means of knowing, the author holds that all cognition is perceptual, although with conceptual elements active in the perception. He says that our *a priori* knowledge — that which led to Kant's dualism and the chaos of later idealism — is all derived from *experience* either of the individual or the race.

Part II of this great book is taken up with the problem of mediate knowledge, discussing first the problem of truth (in which intellectualism, anti-intellectualism, pragmatism, and Bergson's intuitionism are all carefully examined), and the problem of proof.

Professor Macintosh's theories may be summed up in the term "critical monism," as he is in epistemology a "critical realistic monist," in morphology and genetic logic a "critical perceptual monist" and a "critical empirical monist," in logical theory a "critical pragmatic monist," and in methodology a "critical empirical monist." The great attraction about the positions which he takes, to the average student, will be his consistent clinging as closely to the common-sense views of reality and experience as it is possible for a scientist and philosopher to do. For this great service, many who will never read his book, because they will not study far enough into the technical subjects which he discusses to be able to appreciate it, will still owe him a great debt of gratitude, for he has at least made the enlightened common-sense view of the world respectable. No philosopher or student of the technical subjects discussed in this book can afford to be ignorant of it. The student of theology and religion will be interested at least in its conclusions, from which we may expect the anticipated companion volume on *The Problem of Religious Knowledge* to proceed.

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